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Transnational Mythmaking in Post-Soviet Europe: Cold War and EU Monuments in a Polish–German “Divided City”

Key words: monuments, borders, idea flow, public spaces.

INTRODUCTION

Because of their unique location spanning the Polish-German border, the divided cities¹ of Frankfurt(Oder), Germany and Słubice, Poland are a site of particular symbolic importance for the legitimisation of governing projects aimed at the creation of new national and international spaces. Following Fredrik Barth's² argument that identifying difference is most important at the boundaries of groups, this border location imparts Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice with greater symbolic value in relation to national and international governing bodies than the cities would otherwise be expected to have. In order to claim the local space as “Polish”, “German”, or “European”, outside actors, such as national governments or the European Union (EU), have utilised public monuments as a way of “inventing tradition”.³ However, because border regions are also typically subject to both centripetal and centrifugal forces – simultaneously pulling individuals toward the national centre and toward the local trans-border region – these efforts ultimately had little effect on the attitudes of the local population, and instead reflected the centre's goals for the symbolic utilisation of the periphery.

The contested nature of the post-World War II Polish-German border directly contributed to border regimes that reified national difference as a way to consolidate and legitimise power over the new territorial arrangements.⁴ At the same time,

as the communist governments in Poland and East Germany worked to systematise new forms of governance, both Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice witnessed extensive socialisation campaigns. Słubice also experienced a Polonisation campaign, and after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, an additional decommunisation campaign. Finally, as Poland prepared to join the EU in the 1990s, Słubice and Frankfurt(Oder) became the subject of EU efforts to de-emphasise and integrate its future internal borders. Even as geopolitical relationships in Central Europe changed, Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice were continuously considered to have high symbolic value due to their trans-border location, as is evidenced by their frequent use as venues for official summits during both the socialist and post-socialist periods.⁵

Public space monuments in Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice are a reflection of these social contexts. Each of the monuments examined in this essay is not only a visual record of how changes in high politics and public policy were symbolised in the periphery by the centre, but also documents how traditions “invented” by the centre were adapted and modified by the periphery to fit the requirements of local politics and situations. We have therefore chosen to analyse the six monuments we present not from an aesthetic or compositional standpoint, but rather as markers in a larger socio-political symbolic system. We arrange the monuments in three cross-border pairs, with each pair representing a different type and

phase of memorialisation. The first pair are war memorials built immediately following World War II, the second pair are monuments to great figures of socialism built as part of the socialist reconstruction of the two cities, and the third pair are “European” monuments built in the 1990s as part of the EU’s integration and expansion initiatives.

FRATERNAL STRUGGLE, SŁUBICE

Designed by Mieczysław Krajnik in 1949, the *Braterska Walka* (Fraternal Struggle) monument presents a column topped by two soldiers – one Soviet and one Polish – storming the west.⁶ It is similar to other *Braterstwo Broni* (Fraternity in Arms) monuments throughout western Poland⁷, and was meant to memorialise the comradeship and fraternity of the Polish and Soviet armies. The monument is located in *Plac Bohaterów* (Heroes’ Square) in Słubice, and replaced the graves of 32 Soviet soldiers, which were moved to other cemeteries. Its original Polish inscription read *Nasze życie ofiarowaliśmy*



Fig. 1. Mieczysław Krajnik, *Braterska Walka* (Fraternal Struggle), 1949, sandstone, concrete, H - 900 cm. Photo by the authors

wspólnie. Niech nasza więź pozostanie na zawsze (We offered our lives together. Let our tie stay forever), but this was later replaced with one dedicated to all World War II victims: *Pamięci poległym w czasie II wojny światowej* (To the Memory of the Dead of World War II).⁸ The new monument received a more or less neutral response from the local population, perhaps because Słubice’s post-war population was comprised of many individuals, such as former soldiers and persons resettled from Poland’s eastern territories, for whom contact with the Soviet military was a normal and accepted occurrence. The monument remained under the care of the Polish military garrison stationed in Słubice, and in the 1980s was restored at the initiative of local party activists.

THE SOVIET CENOTAPH, FRANKFURT(ODER)

Constructed in 1947 and designed by Nikolai Tomski, the *Soviet Cenotaph* is located on the former military parade ground in Frankfurt(Oder), and replaced a 1925 monument dedicated to the soldiers of Frederick Wilhelm II’s *Leibgrenadierregiments* who died during World War I. The original monument featured a soldier on the pedestal looking eastwards, ready to stand and fight⁹, while the Soviet monument presents a soldier in a sentry-like stance facing the west.

Placed under the care of the Soviet garrison in Frankfurt(Oder), the *Soviet Cenotaph* combines a monument with a cemetery, wherein approximately 1,450 soldiers are buried. The dedication reads: *To the eternal remembrance of the Soviet Army Combatants who gave their lives for the Freedom and Independence of the USSR*, and is written only in Russian. An inscription on the reverse side – also in Russian – celebrates the Soviet victory: *Our cause remains just – We have triumphed*. Cemetery markers and an eternal flame (now extinguished) were added in 1975, and the Russian inscription was supplemented with the German *Ihr Vermächtnis, Unsere Verpflichtung* (Your Legacy, Our Obligation).¹⁰ Concurrent with the Soviet army’s withdrawal from Germany in 1994, the monument was transferred to the town of Frankfurt(Oder) in a ceremony witnessed by approximately 500 guests.¹¹ Since then,

the *Soviet Cenotaph* was climbed by members of the Frankfurt(Oder) Alpine club in 1997¹², defaced with a swastika in 2000¹³, and restored in 2001-2003.¹⁴

LENIN MONUMENT / SIBERIAN DEPORTATIONS MONUMENT, ŚLUBICE

Constructed in the 1970s as a new venue for celebrating communist holidays in Ślubice, Lenin Square was located in a green area surrounded by post-war blocks of socialist-style flats. The monument was an initiative of the local party committee to underscore the special role played by Ślubice in Polish communist propaganda, and to commemorate one of Lenin's anniversaries. It initially consisted of a concrete pedestal and bust, but was soon replaced in bronze. The unveiling of the monument was a regional and international celebration, and included guests from East Germany and the Soviet Union. The bust was subsequently vandalised several times, and painted red in a politically motivated act in the 1980s. It was then removed and buried in the yard of the town hall, where it was eventually unearthed by renovation workers. In the end, the entire *Lenin Monument* was replaced in 1990 by a monument



Fig. 2. Nikolai Tomski, *Soviet Cenotaph*, 1947, sandstone, H - 800 cm. Photo by the authors

commemorating Poles deported to Siberia in 1940.

The *Siberian Deportations Monument* was an initiative of the local Siberian Deportees Association in Ślubice, and consists of two steles salvaged from the *Lenin Monument*. The first bears a plaque with an inscription reading: *50th Anniversary of the Deportation of Poles to Siberia*, and the second holds a small bust of Christ, which was taken to Siberia in 1940 by one of the association members. In 2000, the square was officially renamed *Plac Sybiraków* (Siberian Deportees Square), in an initiative originating primarily with the association leaders. The *Siberian Deportations Monument* is therefore the only truly local monument in our sample.

MARX MONUMENT

Created in 1968 by Arndt Wittig and Manfred Vogler to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx, the *Marx Monument* is located in the north part of the central district of Frankfurt(Oder), in a green area that was intended to be surrounded by new blocks of flats. The monument consists of a concrete pedestal and a bronze bust – a copy of a work by Fritz Cremer – with an inscription that reads: *Die Theorie wurde zur material-len Gewalt* (Theory Became Real Power).¹⁵ The *Marx Monument* was a contribution to East Germany's 20th anniversary celebration and was meant to both commemorate Marx and to demonstrate the new spirit of Marxism.¹⁶ While both monuments were designed to add an ideological component to new housing developments, unlike its Lenin counterpart in Ślubice, the *Marx Monument* did not produce a political reaction from Frankfurt(Oder)'s populace – perhaps because of Marx's status as a German political thinker.

INTEGRACJA, ŚLUBICE

Located in the plaza of the Collegium Polonicum¹⁷ library, the *Integracja* (Integration) monument was the winner of a design competition commissioned by the Ślubice city government for a monument to symbolise the border. It was installed in 2002 by Katarzyna Solima as part of a series of integration efforts and Polish-German cross-border projects that marked a high point in cooperation between the two

cities. The monument consists of two granite blocks stacked in a column and “sewn” together with rope. A stainless steel needle is stuck through one corner of the top block, while another corner of the block is “patched” with stitches. According to its author – who was unfamiliar with the local situation – the monument was designed to symbolise cooperation between Poland and Germany within an integrating Europe. Local inhabitants, however, tend to see it as symbolising cooperation between divided cities, and call to mind two Polish sayings: *Coś jest szyte grubymi nićmi* (literally: something sewn with thick thread = something that is untrue), and *Coś się nie trzyma kupy* (literally: something that doesn't stay together = something that is senseless or untrue). Given that one of the most common complaints regarding “integration” projects in Słubice is that they are manufactured by local administrations to gain access to EU funds and do not reflect a social reality of increased cooperation, these interpretations – quite opposite to the author's intentions – perhaps more accurately reflect the local perception of integration. In this respect, the monument might be a more apt representation of the failed hope of integration in Słubice and Frankfurt(Oder), rather than one of a successfully integrating Europe.

EUROPASKULPTUR SYMBIOZA, FRANKFURT(ODER)

Created in 2004 by the West Berlin artist Udo Cordes as part of a European project funded by the German federal budget, *EuropaSkulptur* consists of two geometric elements rising separately – but still connected and close together – from the same origin, and is intended to symbolise the integrating states of the EU.¹⁸ These elements are set on a pedestal with four plaques, three of which are inscribed with text by Romano Prodi, Guenter Verheugen, and Gesine Schwan on the future of European integration, and a fourth which contains information on the project. The geometric portion of the sculpture was installed in 1996 in front of a factory in Frankfurt(Oder), and was only later moved to its current location in European Square in front of the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt(Oder), as part of “Europe Day” celebrations on May 8, 2004. This fact



Fig. 3. Pomnik Sybiraków (Siberian Deportations Monument), 1990, steles salvaged from the Lenin Monument, concrete pedestal, metal plaques, H - 200 cm. Photo by the authors

was left unremarked during the celebrations¹⁹, and the university and the city viewed the installation of the monument primarily in pragmatic terms, hoping that it would not only add “European symbolism” to the European University, but also produce a media-relevant event.

ANALYSIS: INVENTING TRADITIONS THROUGH PUBLIC SYMBOLS

The monuments in Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice can be understood as a material representation of an ongoing process of inventing and reinventing traditions. “Invented traditions” have three tasks: to create a feeling of belonging, to legitimise the status of institutions or relations of authority, and to socialise behaviour and the transfer of values.²⁰ Furthermore, we should expect the frequency of the invented tradition to increase when “a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which the “old” traditions had been designed.”²¹ Thus, in Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice, we observe that there have been two main periods of monument building: the first immediately following World War II, and the second immediately following the collapse of communist governments in 1989. In several cases, the new monuments quite literally destroyed and replaced the monuments of the old order.

The monuments in Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice also facilitate the flow of ideas between the centre



Fig. 4. Arndt Wittig, Manfred Vogler, Marx Monument, 1968, concrete pedestal and a bronze bust, H - 500 cm, H - 200 cm. Photo by the authors

and the periphery by functioning as public symbols. Symbols have "... a specific function. A symbol hints at something which does not exist as a thing or matter immediately perceptible to the senses... In other words, a symbol tells about "some other reality" and is "the crystallisation of a linguistic description"²² In this way, materially existing objects are useful to embody and present abstract ideas, such as international socialism or EU integration, as well as to strengthen a populace in its convictions regarding these ideas. At the same time, "... the power of symbols and symbolic power do not lie in symbols and symbolic systems as such; power is in the hands of those social forces and groups who authorise these symbols, whose symbols they are, whose self-identity is expressed in these symbols"²³ Because they must be specifically authorised by those who hold power, public space monuments operate especially in this manner, and as embodied symbols, physically represent a system of power relations. In the case of Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice, the power relations

represented are principally those between the centre and the periphery: many of the monuments in this analysis would not even exist if a centre were not involved in an active project of attempting to assert and legitimise its power over the periphery.

Nevertheless, there are significant differences in the absorption of external patterns in Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice during different periods of their post-World War II history, which in turn correspond to different centre-periphery relations. Ideas originating from the centre are often transformed in the periphery, and gain new meanings and interpretations resulting from specific local conditions. These conditions influence not only the local perception of a doctrine, but also the doctrine itself. Three types of modifications are commonly observed: (1) *shortening* – the selective choice of ideas that modify the original content, (2) *completion* – the supplementation of original content with elements adjusted to meet the needs of local conditions, and (3) *imitation* – the repetition of a centre doctrine without real understanding in the periphery.²⁴ In fulfilling the three tasks of invented traditions, the monuments in Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice exhibit each of these modifications, as shown in Table 1.



Fig. 5. Katarzyna Solima, *Integracja (Integration)*, 2002, granite, H - 300 cm. Photo by the authors

Table 1. Doctrine modification vs. invented tradition tasks

	Imitation (Communist Monuments)	Completion (Modified Communist Monuments)	Shortening (EU Monuments)
Belonging	Soviet sphere of influence	Reassertion of national identity	United Europe -> trans- border European region
Legitimation	Soviet presence, closed or highly regulated borders	Autonomy, relaxation of borders	Independence, open borders -> functional interdependence
Values	Peace, egalitarianism, international socialism.	Self-determination, independence	Peace, equality, international markets, integration -> financial pragmatism

Source: Authors' concept

Above all, communist monuments in Frankfurt (Oder) and Słubice demonstrate the process of imitation. They were created by local units of the communist party, and directly inspired by the centres. These monuments follow an aesthetic typical of socialist realism, and they are virtually indistinguishable from monuments in other locations. The symbolic meaning of these monuments remains constant between the centre and the periphery – specifically, socialist unity based on wartime sacrifice resulting in peace, and a legitimate continued Soviet military presence and political influence.

It is also interesting to observe the difference between the *Fraternal Struggle* monument in Słubice and the *Soviet Cenotaph* in Frankfurt(Oder). The Słubice monument is inclusive of both Polish and Soviet soldiers and was inscribed in the national language, while its analogue in Frankfurt celebrates only the victors and was inscribed in Russian, a dissimilarity that demonstrates the different positions of post-war Poland and East Germany vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. As an “ally,” it was important for public symbols in Poland to justify and legitimise Soviet influence by emphasising Poland’s inclusion in the socialist project. As a defeated nation, there was no such imperative in Germany, where monuments could be raw symbols of Soviet power, as is evidenced by the original inscription: *Our cause remains just – We have triumphed.*

Perhaps predictably, once the geopolitical situation changed, these monuments were soon modified to suggest new meanings. In both cases, these changes represent a reassertion of national self-determina-

tion. On the *Fraternal Struggle* monument, the new inscription dissociated Poland from the Soviet Union, symbolically breaking the original inscription’s “tie”. The change of the dedication also shifted the focus of the monument from the victors to the victims, an emphasis that perhaps has more resonance in the national imagery of post-war Poland. Likewise, the addition of a German inscription on the *Soviet Cenotaph* not only allowed the German populace of Frankfurt(Oder) to participate in the monument’s symbolism, it also softened the victorious tone of the original by transforming a past-oriented “triumph” into a future-oriented legacy.

In contrast to the Soviet-era monuments, the European monuments demonstrate the process of adaptation. Given a loose framework of “European values” to work with, both shortening and completion were utilised in the 1990s to create a trans-border regional context of “Europeaness”. Robert Parkin²⁵ sees regionalisation as a bureaucratic instrument, in which trans-border regions might be useful for financial purposes such as acquiring EU subsidies. This leads to the need for legitimisation, which requires a local identity to be established, even if this identity is more a matter of pragmatism than of actual local feeling²⁶, and follows a functional understanding of the development of Euroregions²⁷ in which the Europeanisation process leads to trans-border cooperation as an alternative to nation states.²⁸ At the same time, unlike within the Soviet context, national and European identities in divided cities on the Polish-German border do not necessarily collide, they can also complement one another.²⁹

As a result, the post-communist monuments were designed to confirm Stübice's belonging to a "European" space, and Frankfurt(Oder)'s openness to "European" projects. In both cases, the monuments assert that the two cities are part of a common transnational space (and they are both related to the cities' universities, two flagship programs of EU integration). However, though both *Integracja* and *EuropaSkulptur* are designed to emphasise cross-border connectedness, and are part of broader EU initiatives, they are also idiomatic expressions of this idea, adapted to local needs, reflecting local decisions of content and aesthetics, and sometimes exhibiting pure pragmatism and opportunism on the part of their sponsors and authors.

Finally, with the exception of the *Siberian Deportations Monument*, the monuments we have examined are also representative of imperial rather than national projects, that is, they are aimed at representing and legitimising international governing projects (the Soviet Union and the EU). The location of the two cities in a contested border space made them especially important places for expressing a symbolism that privileges the needs of these international projects more than local needs and values. The choice of sites for the monuments is critical in this regard, and reveals tensions between local spaces and international and national agendas. The Soviet period monuments are located in prominent positions at the centres of newly constructed public spaces, with the aim of mobilising local inhabitants around rebuilt city centres and legitimising a new geopolitical situation, as well as strengthening the ideological foundations of the state. In contrast, the European monuments are located at the edges and gates of territories, and near the universities, and are addressed to local inhabitants and visitors as a way to demonstrate openness and cooperation. Modifications to the monuments also demonstrate this tension, as they work to reclaim international monuments as local or national symbols. For example, the *Soviet Soldiers* monument replaced a memorial to soldiers of the *Kaisergrenadiers* (a replacement of national with international), while the *Siberian Deportations Monument* replaced the *Lenin Monument* (a replacement of international with local).

It is additionally instructive that most of the monuments failed to create any strong emotions among the citizens. They were usually treated as an element of the surrounding environment or cityscape rather than objects of particular focus. This follows a certain logic given their broader geopolitical context. Like the Soviet Union before it, the EU has set about creating an international space subject to specific governing principles. Although ideologically dissimilar, both the EU and the Soviet Union developed a vocabulary of symbols with which to define and structure these international spaces. Thus in the case of an individual monument in the periphery, it is perhaps less important for that monument to make a great political impact than it is for it to help structure and reinforce a larger international "socialist" or international "European" space. It is therefore not a testament to the failure of these monuments, but rather to their success, that, as political objects, only one of them (the *Lenin Monument*) elicited a



Fig. 6. Udo Cordes, *EuropaSkulptur Symbioza* (European Sculpture Symbiosis), 2004, metal, H - 800 cm. Photo by the authors

resistive response. The others were so much part of a normalised political-spatial landscape that they were perceived as benign. This demonstrates the key theme common to all of the monuments in all of the time periods we have examined here: as geopolitical needs change, so do the symbolic vocabularies that are deployed to structure spaces. The “traditions” that earlier governing bodies sought to invent must be modified or created anew in order to fit these changing needs. The monuments in Słubice and Frankfurt(Oder) are thus a physical example and record of how these evolving needs have been deployed at the level of local symbolism and utilisation of public space, and of how an environment can be shaped to demonstrate a broader ideological position.

Notes

- ¹ Divided Cities on the Polish-German border were created in 1945, when the shift of the border to the Oder and Neisse rivers separated several German cities into Polish and German “twins”.
- ² Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1969.
- ³ Eric Hobsbawm and Terrance Ranger (eds.), *The Inventions of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- ⁴ Sheldon Anderson, *A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc: Polish-East German Relations 1945-1962*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001; Helga Schulz, ‘Schwierige Nachbarschaft on Oder und Neiße – Trudne sąsiedztwo nad Odrą i Nysą’ (‘Difficult Neighbourhood on the Oder and Neisse Rivers’), in: Barbara Breysach, Arkadiusz Paszek, and Alexander Tölle (eds.), *Grenze-Granica (Border)*, Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2003.
- ⁵ For example, in 1972 prime ministers Piotr Jaroszewicz and Willy Stoph, and first secretaries Edward Gierek and Erich Honecker met in the two cities for a Polish/German summit (Jerzy Oleksiński, ‘Wielki dzień Słubic’ (‘The Great Day of Słubice’), in: *Echo Słubickie*, July 1972), and in 2004 EU enlargement celebrations held on the border bridge featured ministers for foreign affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Joschka Fischer.
- ⁶ Sebastian Preiss, Uta Hengelhaupt, Sylwia Groblica et al, *Słubice: Historia-Topografia-Rozwój (Słubice: History-Topography-Development)*, Słubice: Collegium Polonicum, 2003, p. 121.
- ⁷ Edward Mrozowski, ‘W pamiętną rocznicę’ (‘In Memorable Anniversary’), in: *Echo Słubickie*, May 1975; Jan Dzikowski, ‘Szli na Zachód osadnicy’ (‘The Settlers Went West’), in: *Echo Słubickie*, May 1975; Eugeniusz Jakubaszek, *Miejsca Pamięci Narodowej w Województwie Zielonogórskim (National Memory Places in Zielona Góra Voivodship)*, Zielona Góra: Lubuskie Towarzystwo Kultury, 1972.
- ⁸ Preiss, Hengelhaupt, Groblica et al, 2003, p. 121.
- ⁹ Monika Kilian and Ulrich Knefelkamp (eds.), *Sieben Spaziergänge durch die Stadtgeschichte (Seven Walks through the Town’s History)*, Berlin: Scripvaz, 2003, p. 44.
- ¹⁰ Sybille Gramlich, *Stadt Frankfurt(Oder) (The City of Frankfurt(Oder))*, Worms am Rhein: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002, pp. 115-116.
- ¹¹ ‘Ehrenmal an die Stadt übergeben’ (‘Memorial Transferred to the Town’), in: *Märkische Oderzeitung*, 9 May 1994.
- ¹² ‘Bergsteiger am Ehrenmal’ (‘Rock-Climbers on the Memorial’), in: *Märkische Oderzeitung*, 28 November 1997.
- ¹³ ‘Sowietische Ehrenmale geschadet’ (‘Soviet Memorial Damaged’), in: *Berliner Morgenpost*, 10 May 2000.
- ¹⁴ Anja Sokolow, ‘Bis 2003 Sanierung des Sowjetischen Ehrenmals auf dem Anger’ (‘By 2003, Renovation of the Soviet Memorial in Anger Square’), in: *Märkische Oderzeitung*, 30 May 2001.
- ¹⁵ Kilian and Knefelkamp, 2003, p. 62.
- ¹⁶ Manfred Folger, ‘Monumenten der Klarheit und Zuversicht’ (‘Monuments of Transparency and Trust’), in: *Neuer Tag*, 3 May 1968.
- ¹⁷ Collegium Polonicum is a division of Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, and is part of a major cooperative effort between Adam Mickiewicz University and European University Viadrina, Frankfurt(Oder).
- ¹⁸ Udo G. Cordes, *Goetzen. Ich und die Anderen (Goetzen. Me and the Others)*, Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice: FFO Agentur, 2004.
- ¹⁹ Jana Schwedler, ‘Kulturstandort Frankfurt(Oder)’ (‘Culture Place Frankfurt(Oder)’), in: *Union*, 8 May 2004.
- ²⁰ Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983, p. 9.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
- ²² Kyösti Pekonen, ‘Centre-Periphery Relations in the Cycles of Political Symbols: the Problem of Modernity’, in: Jukka Kanerva and Kari Palonen (eds.), *Transformation of Ideas on a Periphery*, Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association, 1987, p. 41.
- ²³ *Ibid.*
- ²⁴ Jukka Kanerva and Kari Palonen (eds.), *Transformation of Ideas on a Periphery*, Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association, 1987, p. 9.
- ²⁵ Robert Parkin, *Regional Identities and Alliances in an Integrating Europe: A Challenge to the Nation State?*, Oxford: University of Oxford, 1999, p. 5.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.13.
- ²⁷ Olivier Thomas Kramsch, *The Para-Site of Governance: Trans-border Regionalism in the Euroregions*, University Nijmegen Working Papers, no. 1, 2003, p. 4.
- ²⁸ Parkin, 1999, p. 1.
- ²⁹ Cf. Ulrike H. Meinhof and Dariusz Galasinski, *Border Discourse: Changing Identities. Changing Nations, Changing Stories in European Border Communities*, A ‘state-of-the-art’ report in collaboration with the European Border Identities consortium, 2000, p. 1.