The Culture of Political Violence Dynamics of Anti-austerity Movements in Europe
Registration Number: 2016/23/D/HS5/00192
The Type of Research Grant: SONATA 12
Funding: National Science Centre
Duration: 04.07.2017-4.07.2020
Principal InvestigatorDr Joanna Rak
PhD, assistant professor at the Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. In 2016-2019, she was a visiting researcher and professor at CEU San Pablo University in Madrid and Charles III University of Madrid. She worked on the following research projects: „Researching Anti-austerity Movements in Comparative Perspective”, „Basque Revitalization: The Continuance Trajectory of ETA” i „Współczesna Rosja: między autorytaryzmem a totalitaryzmem?”. The author of books and articles on contentious politics. The laureate of, i.a., Scholarship by the Minister of Science and Higher Education for outstanding young scientists, the Barbara Skarga Scholarship, START Scholarship by the Foundation for Polish Science, and Scholarship for young researchers from the Poznań scientific community. She obtained the first place in the competition of the Polish Political Science Association for the best scientific article published in the peer-reviewed scientific journal or collective work in Polish in 2016-2017 as well as a distinction in the Czesław Mojsiewicz All-Polish Competition for the best doctoral dissertation in the discipline of political sciences in 2016. Research interests: cultures of political violence, contentious politics, and social mobilization. Contact: joanna.rak@amu.edu.pl.
The major aim of the research is to explain the violent behaviours of anti-austerity movements which rose in Europe after 2007 as the opposition to the governments’ activities. The research field determined by time, territorial, and subject boundaries have to be examined in order to fulfil the aim. 1st December, 2007 is the inceptive date of the research. Then, the recession caused by the European debt crisis began. The crisis was an indirect cause of a wave of protests organised by newly-risen anti-austerity movements in Europe. The direct cause of those protests and the inception of the movements was the implementation of governmental austerity programmes which were to contribute to the states’ coming out from the crisis. The closing date is 31st December, 2015. It was the first year after the recession when the economic situation of the Eurozone states improved, i.e., the extent of fluctuation of international financial flow was minimalised, the extent of real GDP increased, a lending rate of bonds decreased, and governmental austerity programmes were quenching. Therefore, the direct justification for the continuance of anti-austerity movements, which opposed the consequences of the implementation of governmental austerity programmes, lapsed. The dates determine the time boundaries of the research field. Its territorial scope involves the Eurozone states where the anti-austerity movements occurred and organised one or more protests against governmental austerity activities. The subject research field is established by the public activities of given anti-austerity movements. A priori, those movements were nonviolent and were not to use physical violence to achieve political goals. However, this rule began being violated over time. Then, the research concentrates on the anti-austerity movements’ public activities which were expressing their consistent or changing attitudes towards political violence from their inception to the end of functioning. The category of a culture of political violence is applied to explain violent behaviours because it is a specific regulator of violent behaviours. The factors constituting a culture of political violence indicate if and to which extent the use of political violence and forbearing from its use was present in the relations between anti-austerity movements and state subjects.
In the project, the qualitative content analysis is applied, as well as research techniques and tools which are coherent with the method. Some research tools – especially analytical models – will be constructed choicely for this research to achieve diligent and maximally efficient research results. Then, data will be collected and measures will be taken to minimalize the risk of making mistake in the work on data. Piecemeal analyses will be focused on the attempts to determine the correlations between particular violent behaviours and the factors constituting a culture of political violence, and to establish what causes that anti-austerity movements change their behaviours when they are active.
The reason for choosing the research topic was the identification, on the grounds of the world specialist literature review, that there is no knowledge why anti-austerity movements displayed diversified violent behaviours. Thus, the planned research aims to establish what the cause of the use of political violence by anti-austerity movements was in some states, why in the other states, which were also overcome by a wave of protests, political violence was not used, and why the movements’ attitudes towards the usage of violence was changing or not over time. It sheds light on a cognitive value of the study. In addition, it is important to the development of civilization because it arms researchers with the devices to predict where and why violent behaviours may occur, and when the extent of the use of political violence will increase, stabilise, and decrease. Apparently, these devices are useful to formulate governmental crisis management plans which are relevant to provide the society with the protection, creation, and distribution of public security. Finally, the research contributes to the development of the field of social studies, including its disciplines: political sciences, security and defence capability studies, and sociology by creating original research tools. It enlarges on both the theory of after-2007 anti-austerity movements formulated by Donatella della Porta and the theory of a culture of political violence.
- Rak, Joanna. 2018. Theorizing Cultures of Political Violence in Times of Austerity: Studying Social Movements in Comparative Perspective. London and New York: Routledge.
- Rak, Joanna. 2019. “Relations between the Installation of Democracy and the Anti-Austerity Protest Behavior: Spanish Indignados in Comparative Perspective.” Aportes. Revista de Historia Contemporánea (Madrid, Ed. Actas) 34(99): 219–254.
- Orella Martínez, José Luis and Joanna Rak. 2019. “Formation of Populism in Spain: Towards the Explanatory Framework of the 15-M Movement Mindset.” Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne 2: 195–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ssp.2019.2.11.
- Rak, Joanna. 2019. “Policing Protest in the Austerity-driven Slovenia.” Przegląd Politologiczny 1: 159–171. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.14746/pp.2019.24.1.11.
- Rak, Joanna. 2018. “Discoursive Self-Legitimation of Gals for Gals as the Movement’s Collective Identity-Forming Factor.” Cuadernos de Pensamiento 31: 121–150.
- Rak, Joanna. 2018. “The Dynamics of the 15-M Movement’s Culture of Political Violence.” In Poland and Spain in Late Modern and Contemporary Civilisation and Culture, edited by Małgorzata Mizerska-Wrotkowska and José Luis Orella Martínez, pp. 229–256. Madrid: Schedas.
- Rak, Joanna. 2018. “From Mobilization to Demobilization: Dynamics of Contention in the Austerity-driven Slovenia.” Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne 3: 49–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ssp.2018.3.4.
- Rak, Joanna. 2017. “How to examine attitudes to a homeland? Towards the typology of irredentism.” Aportes. Revista de Historia Contemporánea (Madrid, Ed. Actas) 32(95): 83–115.
- Rak, Joanna. 2017. “Intrastate, Regional, and Colonial Contributions to Post-2008 Cultures of Political Violence.” Polish Political Science Yearbook 46(1): 281–293. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2017118.
- Rak, Joanna. 2018. “Między relatywną deprywacją a gratyfikacją: studium poczucia bezpieczeństwa reprodukcyjnego Dziewuch.” In Studia nad bezpieczeństwem. Wielowymiarowość współczesnych zagrożeń a bezpieczeństwo jednostki, edited by Rafał Kamprowski, pp. 21–38. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu.
- Rak, Joanna. 2017. “Gnoza polityczna w Globalnej strategii na rzecz polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej.” In Polityczno-społeczne i ekonomiczne zmiany w Europie w świetle Globalnej strategii na rzecz polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, edited by Mikołaj Tomaszyk, pp. 29-42. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu.
- Rak, Joanna. 2016. “Irredentyzm i kontrirredentyzm jako typy postaw wobec ojczyzny.” Principia. Pisma koncepcyjne z filozofii i socjologii teoretycznej 63: 150-173.
- Rak, Joanna. 2019. “Relations between the Installation of Democracy and the Anti-Austerity Protest Behavior: Spanish Indignados in Comparative Perspective.” Aportes. Revista de Historia Contemporánea (Madrid, Ed. Actas) 34(99): 219–254.
- Orella Martínez, José Luis and Joanna Rak. 2019. “Formation of Populism in Spain: Towards the Explanatory Framework of the 15-M Movement Mindset.” Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne 2: 195–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ssp.2019.2.11.
- Rak, Joanna. 2019. “Policing Protest in the Austerity-driven Slovenia.” Przegląd Politologiczny 1: 159–171. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.14746/pp.2019.24.1.11.
- Rak, Joanna. 2018. “Discoursive Self-Legitimation of Gals for Gals as the Movement’s Collective Identity-Forming Factor.” Cuadernos de Pensamiento 31: 121–150.
- Rak, Joanna. 2018. “The Dynamics of the 15-M Movement’s Culture of Political Violence.” In Poland and Spain in Late Modern and Contemporary Civilisation and Culture, edited by Małgorzata Mizerska-Wrotkowska and José Luis Orella Martínez, pp. 229–256. Madrid: Schedas.
- Rak, Joanna. 2018. “From Mobilization to Demobilization: Dynamics of Contention in the Austerity-driven Slovenia.” Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne 3: 49–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ssp.2018.3.4.
- Rak, Joanna. 2017. “How to examine attitudes to a homeland? Towards the typology of irredentism.” Aportes. Revista de Historia Contemporánea (Madrid, Ed. Actas) 32(95): 83–115.
- Rak, Joanna. 2017. “Intrastate, Regional, and Colonial Contributions to Post-2008 Cultures of Political Violence.” Polish Political Science Yearbook 46(1): 281–293. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2017118.
- Rak, Joanna. 2018. “Między relatywną deprywacją a gratyfikacją: studium poczucia bezpieczeństwa reprodukcyjnego Dziewuch.” In Studia nad bezpieczeństwem. Wielowymiarowość współczesnych zagrożeń a bezpieczeństwo jednostki, edited by Rafał Kamprowski, pp. 21–38. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu.
- Rak, Joanna. 2017. “Gnoza polityczna w Globalnej strategii na rzecz polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej.” In Polityczno-społeczne i ekonomiczne zmiany w Europie w świetle Globalnej strategii na rzecz polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, edited by Mikołaj Tomaszyk, pp. 29-42. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
The first part of the research introduced the literature review which pointed out and methodologically assessed the theoretical approaches towards a culture of political violence. This part of the research contributed to social sciences by proposing how to create a new non-traditional research design built around a methodologically structured literature review. It allows a researcher to find the theories of potential exploratory and explanatory power while projecting a study of an understudied research field. Note should be taken, the problems that informed the literature review have a universal value and may be effectively applied to other studies as well. Although the four sets of correctness criteria for definitions, two types of explanatory frameworks, and classification schemes aimed here directly to analyze theories concerning cultures of political violence, their general applicability to assess the methodological correctness of theoretical approaches is much broader. In general, they are useful to analyze theories in social sciences, but they must not take the place of an empirical test because they are invulnerable to evaluate the empirical effectiveness. The particular sets of criteria may be employed separately to analyze the respective elements of theories, but a researcher has to make a judgment what function some piece of model or model performs in a study and then to choose a set to analyze it. Accordingly, the problems and the four sets of correctness criteria make a contribution to social sciences by introducing an intersubjective, standardized, and a methodologically founded way for critical evaluation of both theories and their selected components. Finally, the literature review is the first attempt to analyze comprehensively, systematically, and critically the current body of specialist literature concerning a culture of political violence.
The second part of the research provided the semantic universe of a culture of political violence and its types and addressed the empirical problem. Here, by drawing on state of the art, a culture of political violence was defined as a paradigm of using political violence in a political structure, set by the temporal, subject, and subject matter indicators. This paradigm indicates who takes advantage of the use of political violence, what their mutual legitimation to the usage is, how they justify and explain the deployment, what forms of political violence they employ, and what the intensity of physical political violence is. By drawing upon empirical material, the analysis identified the patterns of cultures of political violence of stakeholders of the post-2008 anti-austerity movements, determined similarities and dissimilarities between them, and formulated a typology. This part of the research contributes to political sociology by developing an operationalizable definition and a conceptual framework of a culture of political violence. It employed them to conduct a qualitative comparative analysis of cultures of political violence that entered European states. The analysis showed the category as a variable that takes on the values that range from placid, through hector-led to militant patterns. It was a first endeavor to create a typology of cultures of political violence in the times of austerity, which is the study’s contribution to social movement studies.
When the post-2008 anti-austerity movements acted, their cultures of political violence were undifferentiated in the political subjects that employed violence to achieve political goals over the duration of the movements. They were, nevertheless, diversified with respect to the values of its remaining four essential features: mutual legitimation to use political violence, modes of the legitimation of the perpetration, the intensity of the use of physical political violence, and forms of political violence.
The structure of the conceptual framework allowed me to approach the problem of a classification scheme in a qualitatively different manner than social movements have been addressed thus far. The simultaneous and joint application of the five critical criteria paved the way for the typology which consists of seven patterns of a culture of political violence. The analysis showed that whereas the hector-led and militant types prevailed on the European political scene, the peaceful patterns were in the minority. It indicates the constantly developing civil society willingly deploys physical force to perform its political goals. Worth pursuing is, therefore, research on the mechanisms and dynamics of radicalization and deradicalization of not only terrorist groups but also a priori non-violent interest groups.
The next part of the research addressed the second problem by testing all the explanatory frameworks which recognize a culture of political violence as a thing to be explained (dependent variable). Those models under empirical evaluation come from the methodologically-structured literature review and show the ways for possible explanations. On the one hand, the study contributes to our knowledge of what triggered off particular patterns of a culture of political violence. On the other, it makes a contribution to studies on cultures of political violence in general by assessing the empirical effectiveness of the existing explanatory frameworks and by introducing new ways of testing theories.
The research showed that the particular configurations of the explaining indicators have turned out to have greater explanatory power than individual indicators or their full fixed sets. Interestingly, the combo of the intrastate (putsch or revolution occurred), regional (rivalry between regions), and colonial (territory of the state was a colony of another state) indicators (as an independent variable) is not applicable to explain the diversity of the cultures of political violence because there is no significant statistical correlation between the variables. Nonetheless, the Negussay Ayele proposal has an explanatory potential. Although it is not a major issue if the three indicators originate in a state in the fixed set, it matters in what configuration its components emerge. The research has indicated that if in the history of a state both the intrastate and colonial indicators occur as well as the regional one does not take place, it is probable that placid cultures of political violence originate in the state. More violent patterns show up in the states where the intrastate indicator appears. This feature typifies hector-led and militant types, but it is the only feature that characterizes the former. The latter may also originate in the states where the full set of the intrastate, colonial, and regional indicators or just the configuration of the intrastate and regional made an appearance in the state history.
As the research has pointed out, the war (on the state’s territory), civil war (its occurrence in the state), and revolution indicators as the fixed and undivided explaining set (independent variable) are far from being effective because its correlation with the types of a culture of political violence is not statistically significant. More importantly, however, the various configurations of the explaining indicators are to a greater extent applicable to explain placid, hector-led, and militant cultures of political violence than Norman LaPorte and Matthew Worley’s original model. The analysis has revealed that when in the history of a state only the war indicator makes an appearance, it is likely that a placid pattern of a culture of political violence enters this state. Perfectly in the line of LaPorte and Worley, the complete configuration of the war, civil war, and revolution indicators is a feature of more violent patterns. When it appears, it is probable that a hector-led or militant type originates. The test of Sue Onslow’s explanatory allows me to formulate similar conclusions. The model challenges a researcher to concentrate on the details of the war indicator but, note should be taken, other indicators are not to be left aside. It may be effective to explore the frequency and intensity of the events in the states’ history and to determine their features potentially significant to the development of the cultures of political violence.
Robert Gerwarth’s explanatory model, assuming that a culture of political violence is a result of the noisy and turbulent politics of the street, the town square, and the factory, in which socioeconomic grievances, hostility to state authority, and new and recycled dreams of a purified community are expressed, is invulnerable to explain the differences between the cultures of political violence. Not unlike William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg’s, Gerwarth’s model is too general to deal with the nature and roots of the complex phenomenon.
The other models involved the following explaining indicators: (a) highly mobilized and urbanized civil society, in the developed states with strong democratic traditions, identified with the state which does not confine its militaries to the narrowly constitutional role and ruthless and determined military governments threatens at length the civil society, (b) tribal and religious loyalties, (c) non-political agencies of socialization, (d) the youths’ engagement in electoral violence, (e) the fictions of political violence defined as novels, short stories, plays, movies, or parts thereof, where political processes and political views are reasonably close to the surface, (f) the internationalist spirit of the 1960s. Empirical research, however, showed their analytical ineffectiveness and indicated that what their authors called theories, theoretical models or explanatory models was only a description of a certain political reality.
The last part of the research dealt with the third research problem and also made use of theories discussed in the literature review but focused on those explanatory frameworks that treat a culture of political violence as a thing explaining other things (independent variable). The analysis contributes to our knowledge of the results of cultures of political violence. It also introduces the empirical effectiveness of current models for the Eurozone case studies.
The authors of the frameworks fixed the blame on a culture of political violence for contributing to the beings, phenomena, and processes recognized by the researchers as having an adverse influence on society. The term served as a label of the source of the undesired events: (a) the reason for destroying the foundations of democracy, (b) a barrier to the functioning of democracy, (c) a factor leading to the occurrence of the hybrid of the parochial and subject political cultures, (d) producing the conditions in which the provocation and organization of violence are not the sole domain of professional soldiers, (e) bringing about revolution to being able to perform the function of an election, (f) triggering off electoral and post-election violence, (g) promoting riots, (h) sparking the context in which ruffianism is tacitly accepted as a routinely used tool of political life, (i) in which people are killed, maimed, disfigured, beaten, tortured, incarcerated, and exiled because of political objectives, (j) creation of the conditions under which militaries and paramilitaries are routinely deployed against dissidents as well as basing a political regime on the army to cope with opposition, and harassing and killing critics of the regime in a formally democratic state, (k) inciting enormous public distrust in the capacity of the major parties to come out of the destructive political legacy and usher in a new political alternative, (l) eroding the secular and nationalist foundations of a moderate state, (m) and institutionalization of young activists of a movement into party politics.
As the results of statistical analyses and using the causal-process observations as well as the critical discussion about explanatory models showed, the scientific approach to the culture of political violence is often biased due to the negative valuation of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Empirical tests have allowed me to reject hypotheses regarding the role of types of cultures of political violence in the field of changes at the level of political structures of European states.
The project offers original databases for 14 states formulated especially for the research, but they may be successfully employed in other studies on anti-austerity movements. They contain the dates of the occurrence of the anti-austerity movements, patterns of the cultures of political violence, characteristics of stakeholders of the anti-austerity movements – who they are, forms of political violence, modes of the legitimation of the perpetration, mutual legitimation to the use, and the intensity of physical political violence – and explanatory indicators – intrastate, regional, colonial, experiences of war, civil war, revolution, noisy and turbulent politics, breakdown of democracy, and culture of masculinity scope.
The research contributes as well to our knowledge of the context-determined cultures of political violence, which is of relevance for the state plans of crisis management and critical infrastructure protection programs, especially determining forces and measures in safety nets for the threat of protest, planning and implementation of the various models of protest policing, the role of state police as stakeholders of social movements, the impact of the police on increasing and decreasing violent behavior, the means employed by representatives of the state apparatus within the relationships with movement participants. The analysis provides decision-making authorities with information about the patterns of violent behavior whose specificity has to be taken into consideration to prevent the transposition of the less violent cultures of political violence into the more aggressive types.